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The Notion of Validity
in Modern Jurisprudence
Truth or falsity cannot be attributedto legal norms, but
an assertion of the validity of a particular legal norm
can be either true or false. As a consequence, modern
students of jurisprudence have adopted certain criteria
for validity which, when applied to a particular legal
norm, determine whether that norm can be called "law."
In this Article, Professor Christie analyzes various notions of validity which have been put forth by contemporary legal thinkers, such as Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross.
He discusses these standards in the context of various
fact situations in which the problem of validity arises.
On the basis of this diseussion, Professor Christie coneludes that the unavoidable choice among proposed criteria of validity is an important one and that the choice
of a criterion of validity is not simply a matter of personal preference. Regardless of whether one has an "internal" or "'exernal" point of view, he submits that
certain methods of resolving the question of validity
aremore fruitful than others.

George C. Christie*
I. INT ODUCTION
A.

THE PRoBLE

It is said that legal rules or norms, like the norms of ethics,
do not purport to tell anything about the world; rather, they
purport to tell men what to do.' Of course, not every norm which
purports to tell men what to do is a legal norm. Yet, since legal
norms are said to be prescriptions as to what men ought to do,
and not descriptions of what exists in the material world, legal
*Associat Professor of Law, University of Ainnesota.
1. Ethical judgments, as distinguished for a moment from ethical norms,
are usually considered to have some descriptive meaning, although under
some theories it is rather minimal and consists merely in conveying the information that the speaker approves or disapproves of the object or the action
which is the subject of the ethical judgment. See STvrmsow, ETHics AND
LAN G AGE (1945). Analogously, it would seem -that ethical norms do convey
the information that someone wants people to behave in a certain way, and
certainly legal norms would convey this type of information as well. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to say that ethical and legal norms directly
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norms cannot be said to bd either true or false. How, then, can
we distinguish those directives 'or prescriptions which are legal
norms from those which are not?
Although thinkers whose w6rk was grounded in the naturallaw tradition also paid attention to the source issuing a purported legal norm, primary emphasis was placed upon the content
of the norm in deciding whether it wag law 2 But, ever since most
men were no longer able to answer the question of whether a
particular norm was law by reference to an external standard,
such as the "law of nature," the "law of God," the "universal
conception of 'Justice'," or "the public good," legal thinkers have
been looking for an acceptable substitute. Failing such a substitute, men would be thrown back on their individual conceptions
of law and not law, right and wrong, just and unjust; meaningful
discussion would be difficult and perhaps pointless.
Traditionally, collections of words.which have been called law
have been termed "valid" or "valid law"; collections of words as
to which the appellation law has been withheld have been called
"invalid" or "not valid law." In this manner the analytical difficulties inposed by the inability of predicating truth or falsity of
legal norms are by-passed. For, although legal norms cannot be
said to be true or false, statements that a particular norm is valid
can be either true or false. And even if all of what are called rules
of law or simply laws are not norms in the strictest sense, the
same questions of validity- of separating the wheat from the
chaff -still
arise. The present inquiry is concerned with the
criteria for validity which have been put forth by modern legal
thinkers who have rejected the natural-law tradition.
B.

REPRESENTATIVE ANsWERS IN BmRi

One answer to the question of validity has focused on the
"purport" only to tell men what to do. Cf. Tomvn', REAsoN I ETncs 78
(1960). It should be pointed out that Ross, who was much influenced by
Stevenson, finds no representative meaning (i.e. no knowledge about the real
world) in legal norms. Ross, ON LAW AND JUsTIcE 8-9 (1959). On the rolationship between legal and ethical norms, see also Williams, Language and
the Law - V, 62 L.Q. Rv 387, 395-99 (1946).
2. For St. Thomas and subsequent philosophers m the natural-law tradition, only the public authorities can make law, since only they can mobilize
the coercive power of the state in support of the law AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA Q. 90(3); DABix, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
16 (1944), reprinted m THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADnRUCli, AND DAJIN 2413
(Wilk ed. 1950). But the major controversy has raged around the assertion
that certain laws emanating from the public authorities are not law. AQUINAS,
op. cit. supra at Q. 96(4); DIABN, op. cit. supra No. 210, at 424r-25; of. id. No.
245, at 456-57.
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manner in-which the legal rule being examined was created. Another has concentrated. attention on whether the. rule is efficacious in ordering the relations of men. The first has, concerned
itself primarily with the so-called formal elements of the legal
system while the other answer has looked primarily to the behavior of human beings. The name of Hans IKelsen is preeminently
associated with one answer; the American and Scandinavian legal
realists have been associated with the other.
For Hans Kelsen, as for most legal philosophers 3 a legal system is a collection of norms, i.e., a collection of "ought" propositions 4 Kelsen distinguishes between two types of legal systems:
One he calls a static system, the other a dynamic system. In a
static system the validity of any particular norm is determined
by whether the content of that norm is logically derivable from
the content of the basic norm of the system. Kelsen's static system
thus resembles a system in which the validity of particular norms
is anchored in a notion of natural law and the Euclidean system
of geometry whose method many systems of natural law have
copied. Any particular theorem will be valid for a given system
if it is logically derivable from the axioms of the system and
from the theorems of the system which have already been derived from those axioms. In a dynamic system, on the other hand,
the basic norm merely describes how the subsidiary norms of
that system are to be created. It has no other content. Any given
norm will be valid law, i.e. valid for a particular dynamic legal
system, if it was created in the manner prescribed by the basic
norm or in the manner prescribed by norms previously created in
the manner prescribed by the basic norm. Such a dynamic legal
system in its most extreme form resembles one of the so-called
3. For a contemporary illustration one might refer to H. L. A. Hart. For
Hart a-legal system requires the conjunction of primary and secondary rules
held -together by a particular type of secondary rule, a rule of recognition,

which tells us how to identify the other secondary rules as well as the primary
rules. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 92-107 (1961). By referring to authoritative -sources such as a written constitution, legislation, and precedent, Harts
rule of recognition focuses attention on the manner in which a purported
law was created rather than on what happens to it post-enactment. Id. at 98.
4. Xiswna, Grara r. THEORY OF LAw .ND STATE 110-78 (Wdberg transl.

1949).
5. Id. at 112-15. This Article will be concerned with the adequacy
of equating the term "law," as it is generally used, with membership in a
system of norms. Whether marginal items such as particular judgments or
the terms of a contract are law is therefore beyond the scope of this endeavor.
For a criticism of Kelsen's inclusion of these items within the term law, and
thus within the normative system, see Morineau, The Individual Norm, 5
Lamn-AEm. L. Rnv. 31 (1963).
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"formal systems" of modern logic in which one starts with arbitrary primitive symbols. Any arrangement of symbols will be a
well-formed formula in such a system if it is derived from one of
the initial arbitrary arrangements of symbols through the operation of one of the rules of transposition.
In both dynamic and static legal systems the validity of the
basic norm is presupposed. For Kelsen, modern legal systems are
primarily dynamic systems and it is thus with dynamic systems
that Kelsen is principally concerned." It will be observed that, in
Kelsen's view, 7 the validity of a particular legal norm does not
6. The -basic norm is something postulated for the purpose of bringing
order to our conception of the legal -system 'being examined. KFLEN, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 134. In the United States, the hypothetical basic norm for
Kelsen would probably be that the founding fathers were authorized to frame
(and that the constitutional conventions were authorized to adopt) a constitution. Id. at 115-17. Nevertheless, in a legal system, such as that of the
United States, in which there are limitations upon what the legislature may
do, -the basic norm may be said to have a "material content" as well as to be
merely prescribing the method of law creation. Id. at 125-26. To the extent
that the basic norm has this material content, it resembles the basic norm of
a static system. The nature of modem society, -however, necessitates that the
hypothetical basic norm relate primarily to law creation rather than to the
material content of legal norms. Id. at 113. In the new edition of General
Theory of Law and State, which has not yet been translated into English,
Kelsen, I am informed, devotes more space to the nature of the basic norm.
In this Article, however, I am interested only in functioning legal systems
and not in the prerequisites a 'basic norm must fulfill in order -to be the basic
norm of an effective legal system.
7. With respect to what might be Kelsen's most -current views on the
matters contained in the General Theory of Law and State, H. L. A. Hart's
report of his public discussion with Kelsen in the fall of 1961 at Berkeley is
most interesting. Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 709 (1963). One
of Professor Hart's criticisms, however, is not well taken. He criticizes Kelsen's view that a delict is the behavior of the subject which is the condition
for the official imposition of a sanction upon that subject. Id. at 718-20. It
is Hart's contention that this is an inadequate definition because
Sanctions may take the form of compulsory money payments, e.g.,
fines; but taxes also take this form. In both cases alike to use Kelsen's
terminology certain behavior of the subject is a condition under which
an official or organ of the system ought to demand a money payment
from the subject. So if we confine our attention to the contents of the
law as represented in the canonical form "If A then B ought to be" it
is impossible to distinguish a criminal law punishing behavior with a
fine from a revenue law taxing certain activities. Both when the individual is taxed and when he is fined the law's provisions when cast into
the Kelsenian canonical form are identical. Both cases are therefore
cases of delict unless we distinguish between them by reference to
something that escapes the net of the canonical form, i.e., that the fine
is a punishment for an activity officially condemned and the tax is not.
It may perhaps be objected that a tax, though it consists of a com-
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depend upon whether it is observed or applied in practice. The
only requirement he imposes is that the system of legal norms,
i.e. the legal order to which a particular norm belongs, be efficacious, that it more or less successfully orders the conduct of the
people whom it is purporting to regulate.8 This is the only contact
that his theory has with the empirical world, and it is, of course,
the closest his theory comes to having anything in common with
the theories of the legal realists. In concentrating on the efficacy
of the system rather than the particular norms of the system,
Kelsen resembles John Austin?
The Danish legal philosopher All Ross, on the other hand,
pulsory money payment as some sanctions also do, is not a "sanction"
and that Xelsen's juristic definition of delict refers to a "sanction." But
this does not really avoid -thedifficulty but only defers it; for we shall
have to step outside the limits of juristic definition in order to determine when a compulsory money payment is a sanction and when it is
not. Presumably it is a sanction when it is intended as or assumed to
be a .punishment to discourage "socially undesired behavior" to which
it is attached; ,but this is precisely .the element which Kclsen considers
to be excluded from the juristie definition of delict.
Id. at 720-21. (Footnote omitted.) Professor Harts criticism may or may not
be well taken, but the illustration he gives does not really illustrate that
criticism. "If A then B ought to be " when applied to a "fine from a revenue
law taxing certain activities" would seem to mean "If the subject fails to pay
his tax then the judge should impose a fine upon the subject" and this certainly describes a delict. If the subject pays -his tax voluntarily, it would seem
that Kelsen's "canonical form" would not be applicable, for Kelsen is concerned with what officials do in response to a subject's behavior. Professor
Hart's criticism
rwould seem to apply exclusively to a case where the tax
itself was assessed only after some type of official hearing, but then it is not
the behavior of the subject which is the condition precedent to the order to
pay but the official assessment which plays the part of A in the "canonical
form." The two situations-the fine and the tax-would then not be capable of comparison.
8. KELSuN, op. cit. supranote 4, at 118-19, 121-22. See also Knrsmam, WHAT
Is JUSTiCE 267-68 (1957).

9. For Austin, law is the general command of the sovereign, reinforced by
a threatened sanction for noncompliance, to a people the bulk of whom are
in the habit of obedience to that sovereign. AuSTMN, T=n PnovncE oF JmusPRUDENcEC

DEamam (Library of Ideas ed. 1954). See especially Lecture I

and the early portion of Lecture VI. Id. at 1-33, 191-216. As long as the
populace can be said to be obedient to the bulk of the sovereign's commands,
most of the -time, any particular command is law, even if not observed in
practice. Id. at 202-07, 13-16. It should be noted, however, that, among the
other differences between Austin and Kelsen, Kelsen recognizes that the
psychic compulsion which impels people normally to obey the law is not always based upon the fear of physical sanctions. There are, for most people,
religious and ethical reasons for obeying the law. urXEN, op. cit. supra note
8, at 274.
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focuses his attention not only on the efficacy of the system but
also on the efficacy of individual legal norms. A particular norm
is valid for a given legal system if it will figure materially in the
decision of a controversy calling for the application of that norm."0
As a consequence, Ross is concerned not so much with what officials have done in the past but with what they will do. The descriptive statement "norm X is valid law" is a prediction that
when facts arise which call for the application of the norm, the
officials deciding disputes will apply the norm in question and
will feel themselves "bound" to do so. If, when such a case does
in fact arise, an official applies norm X, then the statement "norm
X is valid law" will have been confirmed. If the official does not
apply norm X, then the statement will be shown to have been
false."
It should be observed that, although, according to Ross, the
statement "norm X is valid law" implies not only that officials
will apply norm X but also that these officials will feel bound to
apply norm X, nevertheless the statement will be completely confirmed if an official applies the norm. Otherwise, the statement
will be proven false. The statement "norm X is valid law" will
be completely confirmed if norm X is applied by an official, because Ross does not seem to admit the relevance of any other
evidence with regard to the question of validity, even though
under his theory to say that a particular norm is valid law is to
say that officials will not only apply the norm on appropriate
occasions but will also feel bound to apply that norm. One would
10. Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29-74. This work was discussed by
H. L. A. Hart. Hart, ScandinavianRealism, 1959 Cvma. L.J. 283.
11. Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 88-51, especially at 38-43. Ross is unclear
in his analysis as to what it means for a court to apply a norm. He does not
want to say that it always means that the court will decide in accordance with
the norm ,because he wants to take into account not only the situation where
exceptions will be present which will justify departing from the norm -in
which case, of course, the norm is not applicable- but also a situation where
a judge might decide a case not on the basis of the valid law applicable to the
situation but on other criteria. Id. at 4,-43. Yet, when he defines what it is to
apply a norm by stating that the norm must form an integral part of the reasoning underlying the judgment he obviously does not mean to say that all he
means by the term "valid law" is that a judge will think of the norm on the
factual occasions which call it into play. Id. at 42. For, if this were the case,
the concept of valid law as used ,by Ross would be of little interest or help. It
would seem, then, that by defining "valid lav" in terms of predictions of
what norms will be applied by the courts, he means decisions in accordance
with the norm, subject to the proviso that some undefined failures to decide
in accordance with the norm should not be taken, as they normally would
under his theory, to indicate that the norm in question is not valid.
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have supposed that, before reaching a definite conclusion with
regard to the question of validity, Ross would ask an official who
has just applied a norm whether he considered the norm binding
on him. Yet, Ross seems to feel that this question is improper in
a scientific examination of a legal system and that the only directly observable evidence for the proposition that the officials
feel psychologically bound to apply a norm is that they do in fact
apply that norm. It would seem necessary, then, to regard the
proposition that officials feel bound to apply norm X as primarily
an explanation of why they do in fact apply norm X, and this
appears to be the position Ross actually takes.
Ross' views are in many ways similar to those of the*American
legal realists, although the latter would probably have been loath
to use such terms as "validity" or "legal norm." To the American
legal realists, law concerned the interaction of official and lay
behavior.13 Insofar as it is meaningful to talk of rules or norms
of law, rather than consisting of prescriptions these involve merely
predictions, based on observations of past behavior, of what judges
will do in the future when confronted with similar factual situations.' 4 Although there is no mention of the word "validity," these
12. See Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 16, 18, 73-74. In the passages to
which reference has just been made, Ross speaks of this binding quality as
a hypothesis 'which makes possible a scheme of interpretation (i.e. the series of

statements concerning judicial behaviorwhich the jurist -posits in order to
describe -the legal system). It is something which one can prove by asking
the judge. For Ross, as for most other realists, actions speak louder than words.
See note 14 infra. Ross seems driven -tothis position because, like the American

legal realists whom he cites, he seems rather skeptical of any theories which assume that the opinion issued by a judge to explain his decision mirrors the
psychological processes which led up to the decision. Ross, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 43-44. Kelsen, it might be added, would not dispute the element of psychic
compulsion in the application and acceptance of the law. See KXari
, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 274.
While this Article was in proof I had an opportunity to read Aubert, The
Concept of "Law," 52 Kr. LJ. 363 (1964), 'which devotes considerable space
to Ross, and particularly to Ross' emphasis on the judge's motivation.
13. See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 CoLt.
L. Ruv. 431, 454-57 (1930). See also Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism
-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 ARnv. L. lrv. 1222 (1931). Professor
Llewellyn's views underwent some modification since these Articles were
written, and I do not mean to intimate any opinion as to how Professor
Llewellyn should have been classified during his later years. See LLmvzu -,
Tm BRAMLEB BusH 8-10 (1951 ed.); LLEWErLLI, Tm Co ioN LAw TRADrrioN 3-18 (1960). Those Articles of Llewellyn cited in this Article are
among those reprinted in Li-wrnrn, JURISPRUDENCE (1962).
14. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 CoLun. L.
Rsv. 431, 447-49 (1930); cf. Address by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dedication
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statements of what legal rules really are, like Ross' statements that
norms X, Y, Z are valid law, involve descriptive statements of
what judges will do in hypothetical factual situations which might
arise. As such, the confirmation of these descriptive statements
depends upon whether the judges do or do not act in the predicted manner. Unlike Ross, however, the American legal realists
did not try to account for the reason why officials will act in the
predicted manner. Their interest was solely in what judges do,
although the reasons which prompt a particular judge or group
of judges to act will be important for purposes of predicting what
will be done."
Despite their attempts to make the study of law, as evidenced
in human behavior, as free as possible of preconceived notions
of "validity," "legal rights," and other traditional juristic concepts, Kelsen and others point out, rightly I think, how much
the legal realists are themselves caught up within this traditional
conceptual web. 6 To determine, for example, whose behavior to
examine, the legal realists presuppose that they know what a
legal order is. Moreover, it is usually not every bit of the judge's
behavior which is examined but only certain portions of his behavior. Such selectivity again involves a considerable degree of
presupposition as to what constitutes official behavior, and how
are these questions to be determined except by reference to preexisting norms specifying who are officials and what is official
behavior. This difficulty in escaping from the old conceptual web
is, of course, inevitable. It has been well said that modem man
in examining and criticizing his conceptual framework is engaged
in a labor not unlike one who is attempting to rebuild his boat
at Boston University School of Law, Jan. 8, 1897, in 10 H~av. L. Rzv. 457

(1897). See also Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1
L. R v. 5 (1987). The more radical of the American legal realists,
such as Jerome Frank, also focused on the judicial decision and the prediction
of judicial decisions as the central subjects in the study of the law. Frank,
however, felt the predictability of judicial decisions was very low, particularly, though not exclusively, because of uncertainty as to how the facts
would be found by the tribunal. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1980); Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 283 (1981). He
emphasized the uncertainties which the need to resolve factual controversies
injects into law suits. FRANK, LAW IN THE MAKING (1949). In the preface to
the sixth printing of Law and the Modern Mind he also reiterated his disassociation from any attempts to define law and expressed his regret if anything
in Law and the Modern Mind appeared to imply the contrary. FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN AMIND vi (1949).
15. Ibid.
16. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 175-78; Cf. KANTOnowIcZ, TEE DEFINITION OF LAW 18 (1958). See also KELsEN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 270.
MODERN
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while afloat in it upon the ocean. If he tries to change too much
7
at once the boat will sink.

C.

A RErAm

BUT

Dawa=

QUESTION-

WHY IIM OBEY

THE L&W

Closely related to the question of validity is the question of
why men obey the law. Some men, of course, may obey the law
purely from habit, without ever thinking about what might happen to them should they disobey the law. Since most men, however, occasionally do think about why they should obey the law
-more
likely some particular and personally unpleasant lawlegal philosophers have tried to give men good reasons to justify
as well as explain obedience to the law. Under natural-law theories
the natural law not only forms part of the test of the validity of
a particular law; it also supplies the main reason why men obey
the law. The natural law supplies this reason simply by telling
men to obey human law,' s although the question then arises as
to why men should obey the natural law.
For John Austin it was the principle of utility which justified
the obedience of men to their sovereign.'9 Other writers have
focused, even more than Austin is sometimes thought to have, on
fear itself as the chief reason men have for obeying the law. Thus,
according to Hobbes, men obey the law because of a desire for
self-preservation 0 Holmes' bad man obeys the law because he
does not want to get caught and suffer punishment and, if the
only way he can insure this is by obeying the law, then he obeys
17. Te analogy is Otto Neurath's and is cited in QUnIN, Fn M A LooIcAL
PoiNT OF Viuw 78-79 {1953).
18. See AQuirAs, op. cit. supra note 2, Q. 96(4); DA&nN, op. cit. supra note
2,
210, reprinted in THE LmAL PHmosormms oF LAsK, RAnnBucax AND
DABi 424-25 (Wilk ed. 1950).
19. AusTwn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 277 n.25. Included in Austin's concept
of -utilityis a fear of anarchy as -beingamong the least beneficial states. Id. at
186. But even here, as well as in the passages first cited in this note, it is

recognized that sometimes even anarchy might be preferable to some forms
of government. I have thus far been adverting to Austin's notion that the
principle of utility justifies a person's general obedience to the political order

of which he is a member and thus supplies a motive for obedience for one
who accepts this justification. As far as the motive men have for obeying
particular laws, that aspect of utility which counsels avoidance of the unpleasant consequences visited upon lawbreakers would be among the most important factors. As far as particular laws are concerned, Austin would in practice
seem to be resembling very closely both Hobbes and Holmes. See notes 20-21
infra.
20. HOBBES, LEVIATHAx 63-83, 87-90, 110-17 (Everyman ed. 1914).
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the law. 21 On the other hand, social pressures to conformity,
rather than fear of legal sanctions, have been stressed by some
philosophers as supplying men their motive for obeying the law. 22
Finally, others have said that men obey the law because they
have a psychic need to feel bound by the law and that the very
forms of the law themselves create in men a psychic compulsion
to obey.23
As intimately connected as they are, however, the question
of why men obey the law or obey particular laws is a very different question from that of how men know what the law is. Of
course, if the realists are correct and if an unobeyed law is no
law, then the two questions cannot be separated in practice, although separation for purposes of analysis may still serve some
purpose. Since, however, this Article will reject the realist conception of law as not being the most helpful way of looking at
the law, the separation of the two questions and a concentration
solely on the question of validity are justified.
D.

THn. SCOPE OF THE DIsCUSSION

The discussion that follows will examine at greater length the
implications of the concepts of validity which have been briefly
described in the introductory part of this Article. It is sometimes
suggested that the choice between competing ways of answering
the question of validity depends upon the purpose for which the
question is being asked. Someone with an "internal" point of view,
such as a judge, might want one kind of answer while someone
with an "external" point of view, such as a political scientist,
might desire another type of answer. As will be indicated by the
succeeding discussion, I do not think that the problem of choice
can be completely "dissolved" in this manner.
Prior to a general critique, however, a satisfactory basis for
the critique must be established by a detailed examination of the
application of competing concepts of validity to various concrete
situations. The analysis of a legal philosophy which focuses the
quest for validity on the manner by which the purported norms
21. Address by Holmes, supra note 14, in 10 HAJv. L. REv. 457, 459, 461
(1897).
22. Such a notion would seem to underlie Duguit. See Duguit, The Law
and the State, 31 HARv. L. REv. 1, 181 (1917); STONE, TuE PROVINCE AND
FUNCTION OF LAW 343-52 (1950) (discussion of Duguit's French writings).
See also GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES -(1932); Mn~rL, ON LmERTY 85-90

(Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1956). Compare HuMs, A

TREATISE OF HUMAN

NATURE 499-501 (Selby-Bigge ed. 1888).

28. See HAGERSTROM, INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS
4-8, 116-201 (Broad transl. 1953); OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT (1939).
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of the legal system have been created is patterned, in the main,
upon that of Hans Kelsen. Nevertheless, the present analysis departs from Kelsen's at several points, and the reasons for these
departures will be explained. In presenting a realist analysis of
the questions to be posed, this Article will often refer to the work
of Alf Ross. Ross has been chosen to represent the realist position
because he is the most systematic of the realist philosophers who
have focused on this issue. He is also,, in my view, the most convincing. 4 Finally, the concluding portions of this Article will
attempt to dispose- of some questions which perhaps for many
people still remain to be grappled with even after the analysis
has been completed.
I.

A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
MODERN'ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEM

OF VALIDITY
A

Tam A

YsES iN AcTION

This section bf'the Article will apply analyses patterned after
those proposed by Ross land Kelsen to hypothetical concrete
situati6ns. It must be noted, of course, that, unlike fRoss, Kelsen
addressed himself only to'the question of lormulating the rules
prescribing What courts ought to do.e2 As a consequence of this
orientation, Xelsen did not address himself to many of the problems presented inthe hypothetical factual, situations discussed
below, problems which the predictive theories have generally tried
24. Another reason why I shall, in general, explicitly follow Ross' analyis
in pre!enting the realist position is that I wish to avoid quibbles about whom
I -am including within the realist school and what I mean by "realism." As
already indicated, all the realists were concerned with adchoring the scientific
study of law in the "facts" of human behavior. There is continued interest
running -fromHolmes to the Llewellyn of the thirties and on through to Ross
in the problem of validity being discussed in this paper and -thisinterest more
than justifies talking about a realist position on the issue. I do not wish to be
taken as asserting that all iealists focused their interest on this partkular issue.
I 'have already referred to Frank's views. Note 14 aupra. Hagerstrom and
Olivecrona, of course, were,particularly concerned with Alf Ross' second and
less well-emphasized point about validity, namely, the feeling of being bound
which seems .to accompani the law. See note 2 supra. Hagerstrom and Olivecrona sought to find the source of this feeling of obligation, which they saw
evidenced in the -behavior not only of judges but also of ordinary citizens, not
in what they derided as-metaphsical notions but rather in "facts" about
human beings.
25. XsmrE
, op. cit. supra note 4, at 168-69. Of course, Kelsen would insist that the legal-order as a whole possesses a minimum degree of effectiveness,
id. at 120, but in this paper we are assuming the existence of a legal order
possessing this minimum degree of effectiveness.
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to solve. These problems arise because actual experience is immeasurably richer than any verbal formulation of experience. This
is, of course, the source of the truism that no two cases are ever
exactly alike. Thus, one can rarely say that he knows with certainty what, in Kelsen's sense, courts ought to do in any given
factual situation. This given factual situation will always differ
from the factual situation which was the occasion for the formulation of the norm in question by a prior court (and may even
differ somewhat from the more general type of factual situation
considered by the legislature). At the same time the two factual
situations might be sufficiently similar so that it would be unsatisfactory, and perhaps most people would say even incorrect, to
apply Kelsen's maxim that where there is no preexisting general
norm to the effect that the plaintiff shall recover in a specific
factual situation, then the preexisting rule of law for that situation is that judgment must be given for the defendant." This is
a major problem of jurisprudence and I hope to have even more
to say about it in the future. Nevertheless, despite Kelsen's avoidance of the question of how to deal with such hard situations
which are bound to arise in practice, the attempt to evaluate the
usefulness, as applied to actual cases, of an analysis patterned
upon Kelsen's approach will well reward the effort expended. Let
us therefore consider the application to the following situations
of an analysis which, like Ross', seeks to predict the behavior of
officials and of an analysis which, like Kelsen's, seeks validity in
the manner by which a norm was created. As the discussion proceeds I shall, for reasons that have already been noted, try to
indicate explicitly the extent to which my analysis departs from
Kelsen's more simplified model.
1.

A Statute Has Been Enacted Which Has Not as Yet Been
Construedby a Law-Applying Organ

If the statute has been enacted in accordance with the method
of law creation prescribed by the basic norm and the norms previously created in accordance with the basic norm, we would,
under an analysis patterned upon Kelsen's theory, state that
statute X is valid law and that would be the end of the matter.
Under Ross' method of analysis, under which one attempts to
predict the behavior of officials, several possible approaches suggest themselves. First, we might simply say "statute X is valid
law," thereby predicting that in appropriate circumstances offi26. Id. at 145, 147. Kelsen rejects the idea that there are any gaps in the
law. Id. at 146-49.
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cials will apply statute X. Although the focus is different, the
verbal formulation under this approach resembles that arrived
at by using an approach patterned upon Kelsen's analysis. The
important qualification, of course, is that under a Kcelsen type
analysis we are not making any prediction as to what courts will
or will not do.
Using an analysis which is oriented towards prediction, however, we may not wish simply to say "statute X is valid law." We
may feel, for example, that the statute is too general for any prediction which merely repeats the words of the statute to be meaningful. Consequently, in our statement as to what is valid law,
we may wish to use more specific language. We might therefore
wish to formulate and describe as valid law several specific norms
enumerating instances falling within the statute and at the same
time to formulate and describe as not valid law specific norms
enumerating instances which we feel fall without the statute.
Take, for example, a statute making it a crime to transport stolen
vehicles in interstate commerce. We might wish to formulate and
describe as valid law specific norms making it a crime to transport in interstate commerce stolen automobiles, motorcycles, and
motor scooters and to formulate and describe as invalid law (i.e.,
not within the scope of the statute) norms proscribing the interstate transportation of stolen airplanes, bicycles, and baby car7
riages.
Or, again, we may not wish to simply parrot the words of the
statute in our predictions made in the form of "X is valid law"
because we feel that the statute does not mean what it superficially appears to say. Take, for example, a statute unqualifiedly
prohibiting the importation of contraceptive devices into the
United States. We may want to formulate our statements as to
what is valid law, i.e. our prediction as to what an official will do,
so as to read the statute as only prohibiting the importation of
contraceptive devices for immoral purposes and not as prohibiting such importation by physicians.28
Certainly, in allowing us to interpret unconstrued statutes in
the formulation of our statements as to what is valid law, the
Ross approach has much appeal. It seems to allow us to be much
more exact. Statements as to what is valid law become more
meaningful and helpful. Yet, many of the benefits of this approach
27. The illustration is suggested by McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25
(1931), which construed what was then 18 U..C. § 408 (now 18 U.S.C. § 2312
(1958)) so as not to cover aircraft.
28. 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305(s) (1958), was so construed in
United States v. One Package, 86 Fad 737 .(2d Cir. 1936).
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are illusory. The statute may, for example, be very ambiguous.
In interpreting the statute so as to formulate statements as to
what is valid law, the experts may come to contradictory conclusions. Accordingly, in place of that statement under the Kelsen
type analysis that "statute X is valid" we now have statements
that "rule X is valid law," "rule Y is valid law," "rule Z is valid
law," where rules X, Y, and Z are all mutually contradictory and
cannot all be "valid law." Even where the statute is not ambiguous or, if ambiguous, the experts all agree in their interpretations,
difficulties remain. The experts may all agree in their predictions
as to what officials will do, which predictions will be made in the
form "rule X is valid law." The fact remains, however, that the
courts may do the opposite of what it is predicted they will do.
Such situations arise more often than one would wish. The unhappy experiences under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
forced Congress to resort to retroactive legislation, are perhaps
the most dramatic recent illustration of this point. 20
Moreover, treating predictions as to what courts will do as
"the law" involves other problems. As the composition of the
courts changes, predictions as to what' the courts will do might
also change. The meaning of the hypothetical statute as expressed
in predictions as to what courts will do would therefore be subject
to change with changes in the composition of the courts. If the
hypothetical statute is not judicially construed relatively soon
after its enactment, there might be a series of different and contradictory assertions as to what is valid law before the statute
ever reaches the courts, unless, of course, we are willing to hypothesize one authoritative prediction-maker, in which case the
whole point of the theory is lost.
Finally, Ross and most other people who espouse the idea that
statements about what is valid law must be predictions about
official behavior include within the concept! of official behavior
not only action taken by courts but also action taken by other
law-applying organs, including administrative agencies, prosecut29. The unexpectedness of -the series of Supreme Court decisions upon
the meaning of "workweek" in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
1060, and related acts, culminating in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U.S. 680 (1946), led Congress to enact the Portal to Portal Act of 1047,
61 Stat. 84, which, in effect, retroactively overruled the Mt. Olemenw case by
depriving the courts of jurisdiction over suits brought to 'take advantage of
that decision. In the six months preceding January 1, 1947, actions against
employers for back pay for an amount in excess of $5,000,000,000 had been
filed in the federal courts. See H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5
(1947).

1964]

VALIDITY

1063

ing officials, and even the police.3 ° The reason for this is that, as
already noted, a statute may not reach the courts for 40 years,
but it may nevertheless be applied or consciously not applied
quite regularly by other law-enforcement officials. If the predictive theories of law are going to make sense they must also involve
predictions as to what these officials will do. At this level, however, the idea that law consists of predictions of official behavior
is very unsatisfying. In prosecutions under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC has refused to consider
unlucky litigants' contentions that the challenged conduct conformed with the Commission's own Trade Practice Rules 3 ' and
persons dealing with other governmental agencies have learned
that one often acts at his peril in relying upon "official construction" of statutes0 2 Moreover, prosecutors do bring out of mothballs, when it suits their purpose, statutes whose enforcement
had long been neglected.' Finally, courts, when they function
30. Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85 n.1; see Llewellyn, supra note 14,
at 456.

31. See American Life & Acm. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 255 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958). Petitioner urged that the Commission erred
in refusing to consider its own trade practice rules and in excluding evidence
that petitioner had been advised by Commission attorneys that its advertisements complied with these rules. The court dismissed the contention; petitioner was charged with violating the M Act and not the trade practice rules.
32. See SEC v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (SI).N.Y. 1938) (Defendant's contention that he had been advised ,by the SEC's staff -thathis operations were
not illegal held not to state a defense.); cf. FCC v. WOKO, Ine., 329 US. 223
(1946) (Respondent was denied a renewal of its license for misrepresentation
of its stock ownership. Respondent's contention that this was a much more
severe sanction than any that had -been imposed by he FCC in similar cases
was held unavailing.). See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US.
150 (1940) (United States not bound by -federal officials' "approval" of price
maintenance arrangement even during the period before the NRA legislation was
declared unconstitutional.); Clemons v. United States, 245 Fa.d 298 (6th Cir.
1957) <Appellants were convicted of violating the Mfigratory Bird Treaty Act
which prohibited the taling of migratory birds except as permitted by regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior. Appellants had requested an
interpretation of the Secretary's regulations and had received a letter from
an Assistant Secretary which they claimed supported their position. Held,
even if the letter supported appellants' position, that was still no defense.).
33. In United States v. Classic, 313 US. 299 (1941), 18 US.C. §§ 51, 52

(1940) (now 18 U.S.C. § 41--42 (1958)), which originated, respectively, in
statutes of 1870 and 1866, were -held to make it a crime to deny or to conspire to deny a citizen the right to vote in a primary election. These were the
first prosecutions for these crimes. Of. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in
which the Court held that Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 US.C. § 1983 (1958),
first enacted in 1871, gave a remedy against a state official who abused his
authority under state law. It was argued that the statute, designed to protect
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in a quasi-administrative capacity such as in the sentencing of
offenders, are constantly providing surprises for the unwary.
Corporate executives who relied upon counsel's predictions that
conviction for violation of the antitrust laws did not involve the
risk of prison sentences have lived to regret their gullibility. 4
Furthermore, however consistent and long-continued the administrative construction of a statute, courts have been known to
completely disregard such constructions."s
Instead, therefore, of the formulation "statute X is valid,"
which is admittedly vague and, for many purposes, perhaps unhelpful, those who base their conceptions of what is valid law
upon predictions of what officials will do have given us a series
of more detailed but sometimes contradictory and often constantly changing norms, each purporting to be valid law. The
reasons why I prefer the first method of analysis may perhaps
citizens against deprivation of civil rights under "color of state law," applied
only to state officials who acted within the scope of their authority. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's remarks in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501-02, 508 (1901), as
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent rightly points out, id. at 535-36, cannot be taken
to support the view that failure to enforce a statute over a long period of time results, so to speak, in the statute's repeal. Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues,
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 40 (1961) gives some reasons
to support the Court's disposition of that case. Id. at 58-64. His arguments in
favor of the acceptance of a doctrine similar to the doctrine of desuetude of
the Roman law, however, are not only without support in 4The authorities but
are also unconvincing and insufficient. A discussion of some of the problems
of Poe v. Ullman is contained in Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 COLum. L. Rav. 106 (1962). More
recently Professor Bonfield has stated that there are indirect ways of accoalplishing the results that would be accomplished 'by a doctrine of desuetude.
Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IowA L.
REv. 389 (1964). Strict interpretation and equal protection objections to discriminatory application are the more important of these ways. Id. at 393-94,
409-15. Bonfield feels that due process notice requirements require a doctrine
of desuetude. He sees Poe v. Ullman as perhaps pointing the way. Id. at 43639. It should be pointed out, however, that the civil-law doctrine of desuetude
requires more than persistent failure to enforce. The failure to enforce must
be in the face of widespread and flagrant disregard of the statute. Id. at 39597. This is not the usual case and, as indicated, the realists go beyond this
type of situation in asserting "no law" where failure to enforce is the more
likely prediction of official behavior. Kelsen, a civil lawyer, states that laws
may be repealed by desuetude. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 119-20.
69482 (S.D.
34. United States v. McDonough Co., 1959 Trade Cas.
Ohio). See also the reference to United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., in
29 U.S.L. WFEK 2372 (1961).
35. In United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957), § 7 of the Clayton Act, prior to its amendment in 1950, was held to
apply to noncompeting corporations despite the fact that for 40 years the
FTC had construed the provision otherwise. See id. at 590, 615-16.
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be already apparent, but I should like to save them until I conclude my examination of the two systems of analysis in operation.
2.

A Point of Law Upon Which There Are Two Conflicting
Lines of Decision, or a Statute Which Has Been Construed
in a Conflicting Manner by Two or More Coordinate Courts

To handle these two situations under an analysis which concentrates upon the method by which norms are created, it is necessary to go considerably beyond the suggestions of Hans Kelsen.
For Kelsen, there is no such thing as conflicting legal norms. If
one norm commands A and another not-A, an observer must conclude not that there are two inconsistent norms in the legal order,
but that one or both of the norms is invalid3 Accordingly, to
resolve such difficulties, Kelsen falls back upon such maxims as
that, in case of conflict, norms created by a superior law-creating
body supersede the norms created by an inferior body and that,
among norms of
equal authority, norms later in time supersede
7
earlier norms0
However straightforward and plausible such an analysis may
seem in the abstract, it nevertheless cannot be directly applied,
without modification, to an actual legal system, particularly an
Anglo-American one with its heavy reliance on case law. Kelsen's
analysis works satisfactorily when the contradiction between two
norms is evident, i.e., when one norm commands A and the other
not-A. Here the application of the lea superior and lez posterior
rules would seem to dispose of the difficulty. But let us assume a
situation where one norm expressly commands A and, in general
terms, acts of like character, and where another norm expressly
prohibits B and, in general terms, also prohibits acts like B. What
if an act, C, is similar to both A which is expressly commanded
and B which is expressly prohibited. As indicated earlier in this
paper, it would be completely unjustifiable to conclude, as Kelsen
would perhaps seem to, that there is no law with respect to C and
that, accordingly, C is neither commanded nor proscribed? An
analysis which insisted upon making such an assertion would be
too unrealistic to warrant much attention. In the application of
the method of analysis which looks to the method of law creation
for validity, it will, therefore, be assumed that several properly
created general norms may all be valid despite the fact that, with
36. KmEEx,op. cit. supranote 4, at 153-55. The point is brought out more
dearly in KReLsen, Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism (Kraus transl.),
printed in K sux, op. cit. supranote 4, at 389, 401-07 (App.).
37. Ibid.
38. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
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respect to many particular applications, they may appear to conflict with each other. How to dispose of this conflict is, as already
noted, obviously not an unimportant question, but it is beyond
the scope of this Article.
The situation which we shall now examine, then, is one in
which there are two conflicting lines of decision upon either a
point of common law or the meaning of a statute, or a situation
in which a statute has been construed in a conflicting manner by
two or more coordinate intermediate courts. In both of these situations using an analysis which looks to the method of law creation, we would be forced to say "norm X is valid law" and "norm
Y is valid law." By hypothesis, norm X and norm Y, on their face
at least, will conflict with respect to some proposed application.

Under an approach patterned upon the methods of Ross and
other realists, on the other hand, norm X and norm Y cannot in
their present form both be valid law. One must make a prediction
as to which norm will be applied by the courts -particularly
higher courts - in future cases involving the issue in question,
and then, on the basis of that prediction, declare that norm X or
norm Y or, as is more likely, some combination of both of them
or some other new norm, norm Z, is valid law. One cannot, however, say that norm X and norm Y are both valid law."9
By following the approach suggested by the realists, we avoid
having to say that there are conflicting norms concerning the
same facts in our legal system. At the same time this approach
forces us to conclude that an ostensibly valid norm enunciated by
a competent court is not valid law, even though no subsequent
statute has been enacted and no subsequent judicial decision has
been rendered touching upon the matter.
To make perfectly clear what type of situations are being referred to, perhaps a few illustrations would be helpful. In Massachusetts before 1950 there was a long line of decisions which
consistently declared that an agent who made use for his own
benefit of information acquired in the course of acting on behalf
of his principal was under no obligation to account to his principal even when the information concerned the precise matter in
which the agent was representing the principal. On the other
39. In a situation in which two extremely broad and relatively unconstrued general norms are involved, the realists' approach provides the secming
advantage, -if analysis requires that there cannot be two valid norms on a
point, of not requiring a choice between two general norms. This is the
result of the fact that law for the realists consists not of general norms, but
of predictions as to what courts will do in particular situations. Cf. text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
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hand, there was an equally long line of cases declaring that a
professional real estate broker who so acted was required to account to his principal. What norm would apply to one who held
himself out as a broker in the purchase of going businesses?'0
The New York law on manufacturer's liability to third parties
prior to MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.,41 is a familiar illustration of the same problem. We will return to these illustrations
later in the course of the critique of the two approaches toward
validity now being discussed.
3.

A Decision Has Been Rendered on a Point but the Consensus
of the Bar Is That the Decision Will Not Be Followed in
Future Cases

If one wishes to be cynical one could cite United States v.
Colgate,4 as an instance of this type of situation, the protestations of the United States Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding. 3 A perhaps more appropriate illustration is Balian
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.," which seemingly held that
local competitors who claimed they were hurt by a national concern which charged uniformly low prices for locally manufactured
products in their section of the country and higher prices in other
widely separated parts of the country had no cause of action
based upon the Robinson-Patman Act for geographic price discrimination. Although this doctrine was not expressly repudiated
for several years4 5 few members of the antitrust bar used the case
as a basis for advising clients. Under an approach which seeks
validity in the method by which a norm is created, one would
still have to say that the norm created by the court was valid
law. Under a realist approach one would say that the norm in
40. The conflict of precedents was resolved, at least partially, in Berenson
v. Nirenstein, 326 Mass. e85, 98 N.E.2d 610 (1950). The "broker" in business

opportunities was held to the standards required of a real estate broker in
such a situation. The example has been taken from HEAT & SAcKS, Tan LEoAL
PROCESS (tentative ed. 1958).

41. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.. 1050 (1916).
42. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
43. The Supreme Court has refused to overrule Colgate, which held that
a manufacturer may lawfully refuse to deal with a merchant who refused to
observe minimum resale prices, yet all who try to avail themselves of this
doctrine have found its protective mantle illusory. See, e.g., United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See also United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
44. 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
45. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1900). See also Atlas Bldg.
Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959),

cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
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question was not valid law and would formulate some other norm
which, with regard to that situation, would be declared to be
valid law. One might object, of course, that he could not make
a prediction of future judicial behavior upon which such other
norm could be based, that all he was sure of was that the existing
norm was not valid law. In that case one would probably be
faced with the somewhat paradoxical necessity of saying that
there was no valid law on the subject although there was a case
directly in point.
B.

CRITIQUE

Let us return for a moment to the situation in Massachusetts
prior to 1950, which has been described above.40 It will be recalled
that there was one line of cases declaring that an agent could
take advantage for his own exclusive benefit of information he
received while representing his principal. Another line of cases
declared that the same conduct by a real estate broker was an actionable breach of a fiduciary relationship. Let us now assume that
a client has come to us who holds himself out to the public as a
broker in business opportunities. He tells us that in negotiations for
the purchase by his principal of a restaurant business he has come
upon information indicating that the business is even more valuable than had previously appeared and that he would like to
purchase this business for his own account. Like Holmes' much
misunderstood "bad man" he wants to know if he can get away
with it. What do we tell him? Do we make a prediction as to what
a court would do in the situation and declare that this is the law
on the subject? Or, do we say that there are cases which hold that
an agent can act in this manner, but that there are also cases
which hold that a professional real estate broker cannot, and
then give the client our prediction as to how a court will handle
his situation? It will be noted, of course, that under this second
alternative, counsel does not say that his prediction as to what
courts will do is the law on the subject. I do not think there is
much doubt that most attorneys would operate according to this
second method.4
46. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
47. In Berenson v. Nirenstein, 326 Mass. 285, 93 N.E.2d 010 (1950), the
"broker in business opportunities," as indicated in note 89 supra, was held
to the standard applied to professional real estate brokers. A somewhat similar
example of the same general problem was cited at note 40 supra. Before

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), one
knew that manufacturers of -poisons, scaffolds, and coffee urns might be liable
to third parties for personal injuries which they might suffer. One also knew
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We must also now return to the situation in which counsel is
confronted with an unconstrued statute. Under an approach patterned upon Kelsen's analysis, counsel would merely say "statute
X is valid law" but he would not thereby be predicting that courts
will apply the statute nor would he be making any predictions
as to how statute X will be construed. Under the realist method,
on the other hand, whatever we assert to be valid law is what we
predict a court will do when confronted with a fact situation
bringing the statute into play. Of course, a lawyer using a Kelsenian approach will make a prediction as to what he thinks
courts will do in given situations but he does not glorify his predictions by calling them law. 48 Here again, I submit most lawyers
would use an approach patterned upon Kelsen's theory.
I think I have given enough illustrations to demonstrate that,
in my view, an analysis which, like Kelsen's, seeks validity in
the method of law creation more nearly approximates the method
of analysis actually used by practicing lawyers and legal scholars.
Of course, this does not necessarily prove that such an analysis
is better than Ross', although I must admit that the fact one
particular method is used in practice is for me very strong evidence that the method so used is the best one. I propose therefore
to go further and give other reasons why I think an approach
based upon Kelsen's theory is the better approach.
Under a method of analysis which seeks validity in the manner
in which norms are created, we would describe the law in force
in a given legal system in a series of propositions of the form
"norm X is valid law." In the case of statutes still in force we
would, if the statute is as yet unconstrued, substitute "statute X"
for "norm X." If the statute has been construed we would put the
statute as construed in place of "norm X." If we were concerned
also with common law we would try to formulate, in the narrowest sense possible, the rules of decision of all unoverruled cases and
substitute these for "norm X. '49 Now, having done this, we can by
that manufacturers of boilers and of balance wheels on circular saws had
escaped liability. What about the manufacturer of an automobile?
48. Kelsen, of course, recognizes the importance of this aspect of a lawyer's
activities. Kmzsm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 45. H. L. A. Hart debated with
Kelsen the logical nature of the results of such activities which Kelsen calls
"rule[s] of law ... in the descriptive sense." Hart, Supra note 6,at 710-17.
49. The .formulation of the "rules of law" laid down in the cases is a difficult task, but it is certainly no harder than the task under the predictive theories of formulating predictions as to what future judges will do using the necessary precedents as a starting point. I would suggest that the former is a more
practically possible task. The task is not so dissimilar from fixing upon
the meaning of a statute, for, although the verbal form of a statute is fixed for
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no means claim that we have stated how courts will actually decide new cases. Certainly the norms formulated by law-creating
organs are very strong evidence of what they will do in the future,
but they are neither conclusive evidence on this point nor are they
all the evidence that is obtainable. Not only do cases arise involving slightly different facts from those in which the past norms
were created, but we all know that courts have been known to
overrule (or repeal, so to speak) past norms.
When faced with such possibilities, then, what should one do?
Should one hypostatize his prejudices and call these law? Or,
should one say, when faced with a novel situation, that he does
not know what the law is in this situation but that he thinks
courts, if presented with the situation, would do such and such?
I think the latter course, in addition to being the one actually
used in practice, is much the more preferable one.50 To say that
what is valid law are predictions as to what courts will do is to
encourage the view that the law covers every conceivable situation. I realize that all modern theories of law based on a predictive theory reject any notion of a "brooding omnipresence in the
sky" known as the law." Nonetheless, by refusing to accept the
norms created by courts and legislatures as a complete or even
partial description of the law, they may have brought back into
the "science of law" the notion of some all-pervading entity
known as the law, which has something specific to say on every
all time, the meaning of the words used in the statute as well as the meaning
of the statute as a whole is not. Some would despair of ever being able by
the use of words to convey to others, who do not share the exact same values
and experiences, any precise ideas. But the history of the human race indicates
that this despair is not justified. This is not the place to get into a discussion
of the ratio decidendi of a case. For present purposes, because I wish to avoid
controversy as to what are the material facts in a case, I will assume that at
the very least each case -stands for the proposition that on the facts stated in
the case plaintiff (or defendant) wins, and I will treat this proposition as the
rule of law laid down by the case. This is admittedly a narrow view of the case
law. Nevertheless, it enables us to identify with reasonable precision something fixed like the language used in a statute, even though this language is
subject to the normal vagueness and ambiguity of language. Perhaps we
should focus on the cases and forget about "rules of laww"; for "norm X" substitute "case X" in the canonical form. On the general subject, see Gooderson.
Ratio Decidendi and Rules of Law, S0 CAN. B. REv. 892 (195e); Goodhart.
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); of.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-BLE BusH 56-69 (1951 ed.). With respect to vagueness
and ambiguity, see Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REv.
885 (1964).
50. Cf. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOUaCES OF THE LAw 96-100 (1921 ed.).
51. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J..
dissenting).
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conceivable point. They intimate that if we were only industrious
enough and intelligent enough we might know what this law is.
Yet surely, even if we could formulate enough rules to satisfy
the most fastidious, is a prediction which we know is of low order
of probability to be called law? Ross thinks it can properly be
called law,52 but I disagree.
If, then, I might sum up my objections to the predictive
theories of the realists, I should state them in the following manner. My objections are partly that by basing the validity of a
purported norm of law upon the predicted behavior of officials,
the function of the judge is obscured. It has long since been
pointed out that, insofar as a judge is concerned, predictive
theories based on guesses as to what he will do are of no help
at all. The predictions of legal scholars as to how he will decide
a certain case will no doubt often influence him, but these predictions do not give him a sufficient reason for deciding the way
he does 3 The fact that legal scholars make a certain prediction
does not give the mark of validity to the content of the prediction. For the judge, as for anyone who is a participant in a game
and not an observer, there must be some other non-predictive
mark of validity because the judge is not trying to predict what
his decision will be but, rather, to decide, and in making his decision he is at the very least applying the law. Moreover, when
a judge has to decide between two conflicting lines of decisions,
he is not discovering law, he is making law. What is the point of
calling counsel's, or even a legal scholar's, predictions as to what
a court will do "valid law," when a court may disregard those
predictions? Are we to have one notion of validity when it is
judges who are endeavoring to find what is valid law and another
when it is attorneys and legal scholars who are so endeavoring?
The judges' notion would seemingly focus primarily upon the
method by which the norm was created in the past, and the lawyers' and legal scholars' notions would involve predictions as to
what courts will do in the future.
52. See Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 44-45.
53. For an interesting recent treatment of the importance of distinguishing
between the "external" point of view, which may be suitable for an observer.
and the judge's "internal" point of view, see HART, Tnm CoNcEPT oF LAw
77-96 (1961). Hart criticized Ross for failing to face this problem. Id. at 247.
His criticism was based on an earlier critique of Ross' -book, Hart, supra note
10, in which failure to consider the internal point of view was Hart's major
criticism of Ross. Ross did not seem to have fully appreciated the point when
he tried to reply to Hax's criticism. Ross, Validity and the Conflict Between
Legal Positivism & NaturalLaw, 1961 Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires, Oct.Dec., 1961 pp. 46, 84-88.
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Even if one were prepared to make such a distinction to overcome these difficulties, there still exist even greater obstacles
which cannot be met in this manner. For, regardless of whether
one has the judge's "internal" point of view or someone else's
"external" point of view, under an approach whereby the validity
of particular purported legal norms is determined by the method
of their creation, it is possible to identify the law. This is a
point which I want to stress. Admittedly, this identification will
not be enough for one who wants to advise clients or to decide
cases or to write a scholarly treatise on patterns of judicial behavior. To supply these lacks, at least insofar as a legal adviser
or a political scientist is concerned, the realists' predictive theories expand the scope of the term "law." But it must be stressed
that what the law is now is no longer identifiable. It consists of
an infinite number of predictions by the "experts" - whoever
they are - as to what courts will do. These predictions may often
conflict and there will be no present method of resolving this conflict. True, a future decision by a court will resolve this conflict,
but the conflict which is being resolved is between past statements
of what the law is. Since, however, the law at any given time consists of present predictions of what courts will do in future cases,
we must start the whole process all over again. The new decision
which seemed so helpful is now only material relevant for new
predictions as to what courts will do. The realists, on this issue
have taken their point of departure from John Chipman Gray
who maintained that a court's decision was only "law" the moment it was handed down; afterwards it was only a source of
future law.5 4 Ross, for example, explicitly recognizes that statements as to what is valid law can only be more or less probable
at the time they are made. 5r They can never be certain nor are
they ever conclusively proved. It is therefore not only the sheer
bulkiness of what the predictive theories call law which prevents
us from identifying the law, it is, rather, also the fact that it is a
basic postulate of the predictive method of defining law that one
can never really know what the law is. Have any benefits been
gained to compensate us for this loss of identifiability? I think
not.56
54. GRAY, op. cit. .supranote 50, at 93-94, 12,4-25, 218.
55. Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38-45.

56. In this regard it must be noted that if, as maintained 'by the writers
mentioned in note 23 supra, the very forms of the law are what create the
feeling of being bound on the part of those governed by the law, then there

must be some authoritative form for law. Law cannot be a collection of haphazard predictions if -such a notion of obligation is to be meaningful.
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It is interesting to note that Ross, who rejects the notion that
it is the method of creation which determines what is valid law,
falls back on the notion of sources of law.5T Here again the parallel to Gray is present and indeed even more evident.58 Having
made it impossible any longer to identify what the law is, he tries
to save the day by achieving identifiability on a higher level of
abstraction. But I, for one, would rather have a technique which
allows me to know what the law is, than one which merely tells
me where the law comes from. After all, even if I know the sources
of law, I still do not know what the law is. Moreover, if law is
defined as predictions of what courts will do in the future, why
not define a source of law as a prediction that a court will use
certain material as a premise in judicial reasoning. Frankly, I can
see no reason for not taking this further definitional step. After
all, even if Ross would maintain, and it may be doubted if lie
would, that the class of sources of law is a closed class, the problem still remains of deciding whether a particular collection of
words comes within any of the particular sources of law which
Ross recognizes. This seems to be the same type of problem for
which the predictive theory of law was invented. The legal scholar, then, makes a prediction, which he calls "law," as to what
courts will do in the future, based upon a prediction, which he
calls "sources of law," as to what materials the courts will treat
as premises for judicial reasoning. Once one gets on the predictive
treadmill it is never possible to find any place to stop. The sources
of law are no more identifiable than is the law under such a theory;
nor are the sources of the sources of law, ad infinitum.
In conclusion it should be stressed that no one would be foolish enough to deny that there is a large element of prediction
involved in the work product of lawyers. Indeed, skill at predicting is the bread and butter of a good lawyer. The point being
made here is that, admitting all this, it is definitely not helpful
to define law itself in terms of predictions of the behavior of officials. As has been recently pointed out, there is a difference between saying that it is characteristic of a legal system that its
judicial decisions are predictable and that it is characteristic of
a legal system that all particular decisions are predictable.59 Certainly the former proposition is true of our legal system; it is possible to predict the outcome of most litigation. But it is certainly
not possible to predict the outcome of particular cases with suffi57.
58.
59.
C..

Ross, op. cit. supra note 1, at 75-107. See also id. at 45.
See GRAy, op. cit. supra note 50, at 124-025.
See King, The Basic Concept of Professor Harts Jurisprudence, 1963
LJ. 270, 292.
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cient specificity to permit one to define rules of law in terms of
such predictions.
III. OBJECTION: ONE CAN ONLY KNOW WHAT THE
LAW IS IF HE KNOWS WHAT IT IS BECOMING
One hears with increasing frequency the statement that one
can only hope to know what the law is if he knows what it is
becoming. The position is stated more succinctly in Professor
Henry Hart's notion that the "law is a process of becoming,""
a notion based on the evident fact that the law is constantly developing and adapting to changing circumstances. Taking this
truism as a starting point, the argument some people seem to
wish to make is, briefly stated, that one can never accurately
describe what the law is at any given time unless one is aware
of what are the purposes which the law is trying to fulfill,01 Perhaps the most famous recent exposition of the view occurred in
the widely read debate between Professor Fuller and Professor
Nagel in the Natural Law Forum.0 2 Unfortunately, a great deal
of the argument on both sides was expended upon the issue of
whether one could accurately describe the behavior of a boy who
was opening clams with a knife if one were not aware that the
boy was in fact opening clams. According to Professor Fuller one
could not; according to Professor Nagel one could.
Needless to say this is no place for an extended discussion of
this issue. For what it is worth, it might be noted that it appears
that many psychologists engaged in the study of behavior would
contend that an ascription of purpose is unnecessary for any useful description of human behavior. Purposes might be a convenient shorthand for describing the facts, but to many psychologists, and some philosophers, at least, they are not essential and,
accordingly, under this view had best be dropped from a detailed
analysis. 3 For Professor Fuller, on the other hand, purposes deft60. Hart, Holmes' Positivism- An Addendum, 64 HAnV. L. REV. 9209,
930 (1951).
61. Cf. Witherspoon, The Relation of Philosophy to Jurisprudence, 3
NATURAL L.F. 105, 117-22 (1958). See also note 64 infra.
62. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. PllLos. 697 (1956), reprinted at 3 NATURAL L.F. 68 (1958); Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value:
A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NATURAL L.F. 77 (1958); Fuller, A Rejoinder
to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL L.F. 88 (1958); Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATURAL L.F. 26 (1959); cf. Witherspoon, supra note 61
(comment on the Fuller-Nagel controversy).
63. See SKiNm, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 87-88 (1953). For a
philosopher who regards a behavioral explanation as a satisfactory explanation
of notions such as "I promise," "I'm in love," "I'm in pain," see RYL, Tinm
CONCEPT OF MIND (1949). Ryle in his very well written and persuasive book
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nitely are not merely or primarily shorthand statements of fact.04
Whether this is so or not, however, the example of the boy opening the clams does not seem to illustrate Professor Fuller's point
as adequately as he might wish. For suppose the boy had never
seen clams before and did not know that they could indeed be
opened by prying the shells with a knife. We might still wish to
say he was opening clams, and we would also probably wish to
say this even in the case where the boy knew what clams were
and knew that they could be opened by prying the shells with a
knife but where the boy only wished to probe the strength of the
clams and misjudged his strength. In this later case we might still
say that the boy was opening clams even though he definitely
did not want to open -theclams. Thus it would seem that to know
what the boy was doing to the clam we would not have to ascribe
to him a purpose; the same description fits several purposes. In
order to predict the boy's future conduct, of course, it would be
helpful to know what the boy wants to do and then we might be
better off asking him rather than trying to infer this from his
conduct. But describing the boy's present behavior is a completely different activity from predicting what he is going to do.
The law, however, is not the opening of clams. The issue remains whether to know what the law is one must know what the
law is becoming, what its purposes are. This is not to say that if
one wants to predict what courts or legislatures will do in the
future, one need not have a pretty good idea of the values and
motives of judges and legislatures. The point is, however, how
helpful is it to define the law in terms of these hard to articulate
and imprecise values and motives? I am not at all sure that Professor Fuller and Professor Henry Hart want to take this extra
step and actually attempt to define what the law itself is in terms
of these inchoate values. 5 But, should anyone wish to do this,
argues that these notions are a shorthand way of referring to certain physical
occurrences. Cf. note 75 infra for Llewellyn's somewhat similar views on the
subject.
64. For Fuller immediate purposes -which some might call a shorthand
description of matters of fact, such as an attempt to reach end X by means
Y-can only be understood in the context of ultimate purposes which latter
involve the realm of ends and not of means to given ends. Fuller, Human
Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. PHmos. 697, 698-99 (1956), reprinted at 3
NATuRAL LF. 68, 70-71 (1958).
65. H. L. A. Hart seems to indicate that he thinks Professor Fuller might
be making this argument. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals,71 HRv. L. R v. 593, 628-29 (1958); cf. Witherspoon, supra note 61.
I am not at all sure this is so however. See Fuller supra note 64, at 701-04,
reprinted at 3 NATuRA L.F. 70-75. These passages are susceptible of conflicting interpretations.
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his theory would be open to serious objections. Like the predictive theories, which are actuated by the same desires,0 this theory
has much initial appeal and has much factual support. It also
seems to allow us to achieve a much higher degree of knowledge
about this evasive thing called law. One must reply at the outset,
however, that, if one must know what the purposes of the law are
before one can know what the law is, then one will never know
what the law is. And, how can anyone ever know what the law
is becoming until it becomes? Notions like Lord Mansfield's that
the common law "works itself pure"' 7 are appealing but unhelpful. I know the law changes. I would not be so rash as to say that
the law changes for the better.0 ' Peoples' notions of what is right
or wrong in social matters change so drastically that it is pointless to argue whether the law of one generation is better than that
of another. The later generation always wins the argument.
To return to the Fuller-Nagel controversy, Professor Fuller
gives a hypothetical illustration of the development of a principle
of common law."9 The purpose of the illustration is to demonstrate
that in the development of the principle the successive courts are
engaged in giving expression to the often unconscious human ends
underlying the initial decision on the point. 70 Fuller believes that
66. Obviously, a predictive theory could -be constructed that, for all practical purposes, would be almost exactly like the "law is a process of 'becoming"
theory now being discussed. Law would then still consist of predictions of
judicial behavior, but the focal point of al prediction would be the values
permeating a given society and presumably acting upon the judges whose
behavior one was trying to predict. I have kept the 'two theories separate
because Ross -and the American legal realists, while admitting the relevance
of ethical and religious values to the attempt to predict judicial behavior,
distrusted all attempts to formulate ultimate values. In this regard see note
75 infra. Professors Hart and Fuller, on the other hand, regardless of whether
or not they accept the extreme view which I am now discussing, that law
itself must be defined in terms of its values, do not seem to 'think of law as
consisting of patterns of behavior but rather as being something much more
than that. See also FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Fuller,
American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457 (1954).
67. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 33, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 22-23 (Ch. 1744)
(argument of Lord Mansfield (then Solicitor General Murray)).
68. Holmes, supra note 14, at 472-74 gives an illustration of an instance
where judicial development of a rule of law changed it clearly for the worse
with reference to almost any scheme of values. For other such illustrations,
see LLEWELLYN, THE COAinrON LAW TRADITION 110-14 (1963); cf. id. at 20608. Whole periods of judicial development of the case law have been criticized
as retrogressive. See id. at 87-41.
69. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL L.F. 83, 96-99
(1958).
70. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. Pimnos. 697, 703
(1956), reprinted in 3 NATURAL L.F. at 74.
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by pooling their intellectual resources men come to understand
better what their "true purposes" are.71 To the extent that men
in a given society are similarly motivated and have many values
in common, it is certainly true that by sharing their experience
and knowledge men achieve many benefits, including often a more
precise knowledge of what they want. But if it is suggested that
this statement means more than this or that the expression "true
purposes" has a definable content -and it should be noted that
I am not suggesting that Professors Fuller and Hart are making
such a further step - then I must in all candor respectfully disagree. Moreover, in any helpful sense, how does one ever know
that the courts are engaged in what Professor Fuller calls "the
collective articulation of shared purposes"?7 2- As a remark attempting to summarize in a few words the entire legal system
of a functioning society the phrase is, of course, certainly unobjectionable. But an attempt to apply such a notion to the decision
of particular concrete cases would be another matter. Why can't
the same phenomena be explained as merely indicating that each
court which participated in the process of development had a
purpose in mind when it considered the point? Why must all the
courts engaged in the process have had the same purpose in mind
and how would we find out about it if they did? Moreover, how
does the pooling of their intellectual resources enable men to discover their "true" purposes? What is the criterion of truth? More
importantly, what kind of proof canbe adduced to settle disputes
over any of these issues? Can the furnishing of such proof stop
short of an appeal to some absolute purpose of human existence,
a purpose of which man must be said to be intuitively aware or
which is revealed to him by authority? Obviously at the most
general level we might be able to arrive at some agreement. Who
could fault St. Thomas' percept that one must do good and avoid
evil?7" Certainly the development of the case law articulates this
and other equally broad shared purposes. But, beyond that, how
much general agreement could one hope to achieve?7 4
I think that the development of the case law and the description of what is the law can be adequately managed without any
such hypotheses. Under the circumstances I do not think it un71. Id. at 703-04, reprinted in 3 NATURAL L.F. at 74.

72. Id. at 702, reprinted in 3 NATuRAL L.F. at 73.
73. AQuinAs, op. cit. supra note 2, at Q. 94(2).
74. Moreover, one must not overlook what might be called the converse
situation. There are times when men can agree on the correct action in a
given situation without being able to achieve any agreement at all on the
general principle justifying this action.
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reasonable to demand more concrete evidence before adding new
and considerably more vague entities, called "purposes," into our
analysis of what is the law. Moreover, the shared-purpose approach is apparently only to be applied to the development of
law by courts. Insofar as law is being created by the legislature
and by the executive, such an approach to describing the law
would seem to lose much of its attraction because the interests
of legislators and administrators, other than at perhaps the most
general and unhelpful level, are too disparate.
It has by now become apparent, I think, that here again my
overall objection is that the approach suggested -defining law
in terms of "true," "common," or "shared" purposes, or even as
a process whereby these notions are developed- requires us to
give up any identifiable thing called "law." In its place we are
given a vague notion called "purpose" or "becoming" with which
one can discover the law. I find this no more helpful than the
predictive theories of which the "law is a process of becoming"
theory would seem to be a further development, a development
which I think the legal realists would not have applauded."
Everyone knows that men have purposes, but 2000 years of development have shown, I think, that agreement on purposes at
a sufficiently concrete level to permit the incorporation of purposes into the actual statement of legal rules is, for all practical
purposes, impossible. I just cannot see, therefore, how it is a gain
in theory to scrap an identifiable concept of law for one that is
not identifiable, one that is almost by definition unidentifiable. I
would rather know what the law is, even if it means that there is
a lot more that I must know before I can decide cases or predict
how cases will be decided, than expand the notion of law so as to
include everything I want to know but at the cost of making the
75. In expounding his own version of the American legal realists' predictive theories, Llewellyn expressed his reluctance to make value judgments
above those necessary "in any scientific inquiry." Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurlsprudence-The Next Step, 30 CoLum. L. Ra,. 431, 445-47. Llewellyn felt
that such value judgments would so dilute the content of law as to prevent
useful analysis. Ibid. He states that he is opposed to attempts to set up "a
fictitious unity in the law." Id. at 455. Ross also recognizes that any study
of behavior must study human values, but he finds no unifying theme for such
values and indeed distrusts all attempts to find such unifying themes. Ross,
op. cit. supra note 1, chs. 10-17. He concludes that "the legal consciousness

prevailing among the population can only -be taken into consideration (by
the legislator) as a spiritual factor on which the practical feasibility of a legal
reform depends." Id. at 372. In his earlier work Ross also struck out against
the "magic" and "superstitution" permeating discussion about law. Ross,
TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE

(Fausboll transl. 1946).
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law unknowable. I am particularly afraid that by defining purpose
into the law one will be able more readily to inject his personal
prejudices into the law than if one were frankly to recognize that
the ascription of a purpose to a statute, or even to a line of precedents, by a court is usually a law-creating activity and not a lawdiscovering one. As skeptical as I am of my ability accurately to
discover the true purposes of other's actions, I am even more
skeptical of the ability of others to tell me what my "true" purposes are.
As Professor H. L. A. Hart has already noted, the point is not
that judges in deciding cases must not or, in fact, do not appeal to
notions of what law ought to be1 Professor Fuller is right to
stress this and to suggest that such appeal is to some degree present in more cases than many people seem willing to admit. I
might add that the point is not even whether human beings may
not be said to share some common general urges and desires. There
would be no reason for grouping individual men together in the
class of human beings if this were not the case. The point is,
rather, whether these vague notions of what law ought to be are
to be considered part of what is called law. The dangers consequent to the making of this incorporation are, if some repetition
may be excused, that what would now be called law is unmnageably complex and vague and that the law-creating function of
judges, the discovery of which was a major advance in the development of legal philosophy, is again in danger of being obscured.

76. Hart, supranote 65, at 612. See also id. at 614.

